Electronic Money Association

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David Pitt CEO Pay.UK 2 Thomas More Square London E1W 1YN

30 June 2023

Dear David

Re: EMA response to the EFD consultation on technical standards and non-functional requirements

The EMA is the European trade body representing electronic money issuers and alternative payment service providers. Our members include leading payments and ecommerce businesses worldwide, providing online payments, card-based products, electronic vouchers, and mobile payment instruments. A list of current EMA members is provided at the end of this document.

I would be grateful for your consideration of our comments and proposals.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Thaer Sabri

Chief Executive Officer

Electronic Money Association

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On the technical standards

• Use of accounts without a uniquely associated account number

Many EMIs provide accounts to their customers that do not have a uniquely associated account number (or IBAN). For instance, EMIs often allow their customers to fund their e-money account: the e-money account has a unique identifier, and the customer initiates a transfer to a bank account to fund the e-money account. However, the unique identifier of the bank account is associated with the e-money institution rather than the individual e-money account holder.

The EMI reconciles the funds received into the bank account (in the name of the

EMI) using a secondary reference acting as an internal e-money account identifier and issues e-money to the relevant customer e-money account (in the customers' name). In this scenario, a data request applied to a payment intended for a beneficiary e-money account may not provide pertinent information unless the API can accommodate secondary account identifiers for the e-money account.

Similarly, intermediate PSPs may receive transactions for their customers into an account with an account number associated with the PSP name rather than the individual customer. Again, a data request applied to this transaction, which would be intended to capture information on the beneficiary customer of this intermediate PSP, would not provide relevant information unless the API can accommodate this scenario.

This could lead to transactions being flagged as "risky" because of a lack of relevant information on the final customer, as the information on the pooled account would not be relevant to assess the fraud risk.

A possible solution would be the use of the unique identifier associated with that e-money account or transaction. That would allow the EMI or PSP to provide accurate information in relation to the end-user. We note that the EFD Request specification identifies a Debtor Account Reference elements that can be potentially used to attach the unique reference of an e-money account (that is "hiding" behind the IBAN of the pool account) of the PSP.

Alternatively, the structure of the Creditor/Debtor Account Identification elements should be expanded to accommodate including individual e-money account references as well as the IBAN of a Pool Account. Please note that this unique identifier may be composed of letters, numbers of even special characters (@ for example). Since the inclusion of individual e-money account



references is necessary to allow the PSP to credit incoming funds to the correct e-money account, it should be possible to share this referenced in EFD Request/Response messages.

• Information on the debtor account(s) in the case of multiple accounts

We note that some of the data requests on the debtor or the creditor (e.g. the account turnover, the balance of the account) are limited to the account this client has, and not all of the accounts held by the specific financial institution. Some firms have specific business models (e.g. multiple accounts held in multiple currencies for the same client) where it would be more relevant to be able to provide the information for all accounts held by the financial institution.

Accounts used for money transfer

Some firms use bank accounts to provide cross-border money transfer services. In this case, the first leg of the transaction, from the client account to the firm's UK bank account, may be the object of an EFD data request.

Being able to inform other financial institutions that this account is used by a regulated firm for money transfer purposes would avoid the account being deemed "suspicious" or "fraudulent".

On the non-functional requirements

Costs and fee model

We understand that the costs and the fee model are still being discussed. We want to point out that it is essential that the costs remain reasonable, especially to prevent the exclusion of smaller firms that would therefore be more exposed to fraud and fraudsters.

Regarding the possible cost model, the enrollment and annual fees should be reasonable, proportionate and equitable to avoid acting as a large barrier to joining the solution.

Access by PISPs

It remains unclear whether or not PISPs would be able to join the EFD, or respond to EFD requests, or if they are currently out of scope. Clarification on this topic would be welcomed.

• Service Levels

It is not clear how Pay.UK will be sharing service level information with customers. Such information (on API performance, availability) will be an important input to customers' fraud management workflows.



It would also be helpful to clarify the API performance figures that Pay.UK is committed to delivering to customers (and associated Warranties, Service Credit arrangements in case of subpar performance).

• Customer onboarding

We encourage Pay.UK to clarify the use of accreditation and/or of a self-certification process to onboard customers to the solution either directly or indirectly (through aggregators).

It is important to ensure a consistent, timely onboarding process that ensures that entities that exchange fraud data comply with the Pay.UK security and data protection requirements.



List of EMA members as of June 2023

AAVE LIMITED Google Payment Ltd

Airbnb Inc HUBUC

Airwallex (UK) Limited IDT Financial Services Limited

Allegro Group Imagor SA

Amazon Ixaris Systems Ltd

American Express J. P. Morgan Mobility Payments

ArcaPay UAB Solutions S. A.

Banked Modulr Finance Limited

<u>Bitstamp</u> <u>MONAVATE</u>

BlaBla Connect UK Ltd Moneyhub Financial Technology Ltd

Blackhawk Network EMEA Limited Moorwand
Boku Inc MuchBetter

Booking Holdings Financial Services myPOS Payments Ltd

International Limited Nuvei Financial Services Ltd

BVNK OFX
CashFlows OKTO

<u>Checkout Ltd</u> <u>One Money Mail Ltd</u>

<u>Circle</u> <u>OpenPayd</u> <u>Citadel Commerce UK Ltd</u> <u>Own.Solutions</u>

<u>Contis</u>

Corner Banca SA

Park Card Services Limited

Paymentsense Limited

<u>Crypto.com</u> <u>Paynt</u>

eBay Sarl Payoneer Europe Limited

ECOMMPAY Limited PayPal Europe Ltd
Em@ney Plc Paysafe Group
emerchantpay Group Ltd Paysend EU DAC

Etsy Ireland UC Plaid

Euronet Worldwide Inc PPRO Financial Ltd

Facebook Payments International Ltd PPS

Financial House Limited Ramp Swaps Ltd

First Rate Exchange Services Remitly
FIS Revolut
Flex-e-card Ripple

<u>Flywire</u> <u>Securiclick Limited</u>

<u>Gemini</u> <u>Skrill Limited</u>

Globepay Limited Soldo Financial Services Ireland DAC

GoCardless Ltd Square



<u>Stripe</u> <u>VallettaPay</u>

SumUp LimitedVitesse PSP LtdSwile PaymentViva Payments SA

Syspay Ltd Weavr Limited

<u>Transact Payments Limited</u> <u>WEX Europe UK Limited</u>

<u>TransferMate Global Payments</u> <u>Wirex Limited</u>

<u>TrueLayer Limited</u> <u>Wise</u>

Trustly Group AB WorldFirst

<u>Uber BV</u> <u>Yapily Ltd</u>